Aesthetics of Immersion : Collective Effervescence, Bodily Synchronisation and the Sensory Navigation of the Sacred by Schüler, Sebastian
Sebastian Schüler
Aesthetics of Immersion: Collective
Effervescence, Bodily Synchronisation and
the Sensory Navigation of the Sacred
[I]f collective life awakens religious thought on reaching a certain degree of intensity, it is
because it brings out a state of effervescence which changes the conditions of psychic ac-
tivity.Vital energies are over-extended, passions more active, sensations stronger; there are
even some which are produced only at this moment. A man does not recognize himself; he
feels himself transformed and consequently he transforms the environment (Durkheim
[1912] 1976, 422).
1 Introduction
In this chapter I will examine the concept of aesthetics of immersion as a con-
nective concept for the aesthetics of religion. With the term immersion I refer
to typical feelings, emotions and bodily experiences of getting-drawn-into-some-
thing as they can occur in collective religious rituals or different forms of med-
itation. The aim of this study is to better understand the sensory side of collective
ritual arousals as they were described by the famous sociologist Émile Durkheim
(1976, 422) in terms of collective effervescence. Approaching the aesthetics of im-
mersion is thus asking about the sensory perception implied when people empa-
thetically and bodily dive, or get drawn into, a particular vibrant atmosphere.
Immersion in more general terms can refer to the emotional arousal of a
group, listening to music or the viewing of painted art. The aesthetics of immer-
sion therefore asks how individuals consciously and subconsciously play with
the dissolving of emotional and cognitive distances in certain situations. How
does someone get drawn into a particular feeling or sensation through the spe-
cial design of a room, the atmospheric use of light, the contemplation of a pic-
ture, watching a movie, playing a video game or participating in a rhythmic
movement?
It is a fact that questions concerning the aesthetics of immersion have mostly
been addressed in media studies and art history, focusing on immersive percep-
tion constrained and induced by space (Bieger 2007), virtual reality (Nechvatal
2009), playing video games (Jennett et al. 2008), or beholding art (Grau 2005).
Sociological studies, however, have too often neglected the immersive character
of collective rituals. The purpose of this article is, therefore, to broaden and
sharpen the perspective of an aesthetics of immersion for the study of religions
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and to develop an analytical framework for investigating collective efferves-
cence.
I will argue that the concept of immersion is 1) a crucial aspect for under-
standing (the emergence of) collective effervescence, and 2) comprises a twofold
dynamic that includes a feeling of getting-drawn-into (affect) and a feeling of let-
ting-go (control). This already indicates that immersion can count as a complex
mechanism in the unfolding of collective dynamics of effervescent rituals. With
this aesthetics of immersion approach I hope to make a contribution to a better
understanding of specific states of arousal and ecstasy as they can be found in
collective effervescence and immersive forms of meditation. In order to develop
this approach, I will first discuss some of the existing attempts to sharpen Dur-
kheim’s concept of collective effervescence. Secondly, I will introduce the con-
cept of embodied synchronisation in order to corroborate the physical and sen-
sory foundations of collective effervescence. Finally, I will elaborate on the
concept and character of immersion as an aesthetical approach to collective ef-
fervescence and develop an analytical framework based on the twofold nature of
immersion. This framework will be briefly applied to the phenomenon of speak-
ing in tongues (glossolalia) in order to exemplify the ambivalent character and
different modes of immersion.
2 Collective Effervescence: Durkheim’s Concept and Beyond
Whether it be a jumping crowd in a pop concert, a singing choir, or a dancing
couple, it is always sensational and agitating when people interact with each
other and when this mutual interaction unfolds some kind of dynamic quality
that becomes detached from the individual and, at the same time, seems to at
least partly control his or her behaviour. This is what Émile Durkheim termed,
about one hundred years ago, collective effervescence. Since then sociologists
and psychologists have made use of Durkheim’s term to explain what is com-
monly referred to as irrational behaviours, such as the unfolding of aggression
in hooligan groups or the state of trance and ecstasy of participants in a collec-
tive ritual. The attribution of effervescent states as something irrational derives
from the impression that people who enter a group dynamic do not act according
to their usual standards, but somehow seem to be out of control or to have lost
themselves (or their ordinary behaviours).
Durkheim’s theory of collective effervescence still plays a prominent role in
sociological studies of all kinds, and particularly when it comes to questions
concerning the emotional and social effects of collective rituals and group dy-
namics. Sociologists have been mostly interested in the functional outcomes of
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collective arousals, such as group cohesion. What has attracted less attention,
however, are the sensory and emotional foundations of collective arousals. Al-
though the social functions of collective effervescence have been well explored
in sociology, this cannot be said of the question how collective effervescence
emerges in the first place.What is the material basis, what are the physiological,
emotional and cognitive dispositions driving the dynamics of collective interac-
tions that lead to collective effervescence? And how is this immersive moment of
getting drawn into the social dynamic of the group perceived by the individual?
In “The Elementary Forms of Religious Life”, Durkheim (1976, 215, 353) used
the example of corroboree festivals among Australian aboriginal cultures to de-
scribe a prototype of social collectivisation. In his theory, during the corroboree
ritual participants fall into an enthusiastic and emotional state of arousal, and at
the same time this collective arousal creates a new group identity, which be-
comes symbolised in an icon (totem of the clan), which again becomes incorpo-
rated by the individual through the ritual dance, often demonstrated by the act-
ing of the dancer as the totem animal. For Durkheim, in this way societies and
groups create a collective identity in which the sacred becomes demarcated from
the mundane, the transcendent from the everyday (Durkheim 1976, 262, 302).
Important to his theory is his observation that such forms of collectivisation,
and their integrative function for a society, can be found in all cultures including
modern ones, and further, that such forms of collectivisation build a starting
point for transcendental (group) experiences. In his basic distinction between
the profane and the sacred, Durkheim emphasised collective rituals as a core
mechanism for creating a feeling for the sacred and for a communality and co-
hesion of the group. Although the sentiment of communality and group cohesion
can be found in many different collective gatherings and group activities, it
seems religious communities especially make use of this social instrument, in
order to periodically restore their identity. Whether or not Durkheim’s approach
can sufficiently explain the social origins of religion cannot be discussed here,
and this question refers to a long-standing and ongoing debate within the
study of religions. For the sake of convenience, I understand forms of collective
effervescence as a potential, but not inevitable, building block for the emergence
or construction of things deemed sacred (Taves 2013).
The idea of effervescence—the term usually means the escape of gas in a liq-
uid solution and the foaming effects of it—and the way Durkheim used it in his
theory has inspired generations of scholars¹ in the study of religions and sociol-
ogy. Some have fathomed the concept’s depth by bringing it into relation with
 For a comprehensive overview and discussion, see Buehler (2012). See also Pickering (1984).
Aesthetics of Immersion 369
other concepts such as Weber’s charisma (Carlton-Ford 1992), Turner’s liminality
(Pickering 1984; Berger 2016) or the concept of emergence (Sawyer 2002). Others
have applied it not only to religious events but also to all kinds of social collec-
tivisations. Michel Maffesoli (1986), for example, describes all kinds of social in-
teractions in which smaller or greater emotional arousals occur and which un-
fold a socially orgiastic, not-purpose-driven dynamic in terms of a collective
effervescence. Yet, in the way Maffesoli uncovers collective effervescence in
many different social encounters, the term is used too widely to be distinctive.
In addition, Maffesoli, like Durkheim, is chiefly interested in the social function
of collective arousals as social forms of integration and as mechanisms for social
cohesion. This makes sense on a macro-level of analysis and for the question as
to how societies work. What it fails to look at are the mechanisms on a micro-
level, which lead to collective effervescence in the first place and to the individ-
ual experiences and sensations that precede and shape the emergence of collec-
tive effervescence. Durkheim’s concept of effervescence starts from the assump-
tion that the participants in a collective ritual somehow lose rational control over
themselves and fall into an emotional state of uncontrolled or uncontrollable af-
fective behaviour. He therefore points out:
But when a corrobbori takes place, everything changes. Since the emotional and passional
faculties of the primitive are only imperfectly placed under the control of his reason and
will, he easily loses control of himself. Any event of some importance puts him quite out-
side himself. […] There are at once transports of enthusiasm. In the contrary conditions, he
is to be seen running here and there like a madman, giving himself up to all sorts of im-
moderate movements, crying, shrieking, rolling in the dust, throwing it in every direction,
biting himself, brandishing his arms in a furious manner, etc. (Durkheim 1976, 215)
The ecstatic state of the individual seems to become decoupled from his or her
cognitive control. Yet, Durkheim never saw such phenomena as pathological, as
psychologists of his time did (Buehler 2012, 75). Rather, he discovered a social
mechanism in collective effervescence that can be found in many social move-
ments and group gatherings. In fact, for Durkheim emotional arousal just
seems to happen as a result of people coming together. Unfortunately, he re-
mained unclear about the concrete social arrangements, the mentalities, the sen-
timents, as well as collectively shared ideas,which precede the emergence of col-
lective effervescence. What is cause, and what is effect?
A central question therefore is, what are the dispositions for collective effer-
vescence, and how can they best be described? And how do individuals experi-
ence the moment of getting drawn into a collective dynamic—such as losing con-
trol over themselves or a high degree of apperception? There have been some
efforts to look at this micro-level of collective effervescence in recent years; to
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follow a few examples are discussed briefly. As will be shown, all of them at-
tempt to approach the sensuous side of collective effervescence by making use
of related concepts and terminology. After this brief review, I will proceed to
my own attempt to investigate this question by taking a closer look at the con-
cept of immersion.
Not only Durkheim, and later Maffesoli, but also other scholars, such as
Georg Simmel, Marcel Mauss, Max Weber, Karl Mannheim, or Randall Collins,
have highlighted the energetic transference of emotional enthusiasm from one
individual to another and the effects it has on individuals of losing themselves
in moments of collective effervescence. Sociologist Randall Collins (2004, xii),
for instance, provides the following description: “Part of the collective efferves-
cence of a highly focused, emotionally entrained interaction is apportioned to
the individuals, who come away from the situation carrying the group-aroused
emotion for a time in their bodies”. Yet, what Collins describes remains fuzzy
for it does not explain how collective effervescence emerges from the perspective
of the individual’s perception or the role of the senses in that process of emer-
gence. A more promising attempt was developed by sociologists Leistner and
Schmidt-Lux (2012) who investigated the conditions and constraints that are nec-
essary for the emergence of collective effervescence, particularly as it emerges in
forms of group-aroused ecstasy, such as in fan cultures. They argue that sociol-
ogy today must take emotions more seriously in order to include the affective
side of social collectivisations, which can be seen as the foundation of all
kinds of social phenomena. For them, ecstasy provides a good opportunity to in-
vestigate social collectivisation as it demarcates extraordinary from ordinary
events (2012, 317). Thus, they define ecstasy as a collectively induced emotional
state in which emotions become so intense that they seem to carry away the in-
dividual’s behaviour and feelings. Leistner and Schmidt-Lux are aware of the fact
that most sociologists would refer to Durkheim’s concept of effervescence in
order to explain the functions of group ecstasy, yet they argue that Durkheim
failed to explain how effervescence emerges. They further point out that accord-
ing to Durkheim effervescence seems to emerge just by the fact of people gath-
ering. By contrast, they argue that effervescence does not occur automatically,
nor does it occur very often in societies, since the dispositions that lead to the
emergence of effervescence have too many prerequisites (2012, 318). Based on
their own image analysis of a photograph of fans standing in a stadium watching
a game of soccer, they came to the understanding that individuals stand together
and watch the game as a collective event, but they seem more or less enthusias-
tic about it and they do not yet form a collective body of ecstasy. According to
their observations, the crucial moment in collective effervescence is the point
of collectively letting loose (kollektives Fallenlassen). In consequence, they
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raise three intriguing questions: 1) What are the frame conditions that lead to-
ward and induce this moment of collectively letting loose? 2) What are the under-
lying dynamics that foster such a situation? and 3) When and how do people ac-
tually lose control over their bodies? Leistner and Schmidt-Lux find their
answers in a combination of three instructive theories, proposed by Émile Dur-
kheim, Randall Collins and Helmuth Plessner. I cannot unfold their complete ar-
gument here or go into the details of these three theories. But they draw our at-
tention to the fact that a moment of collectively letting loose is conditioned by
both frame conditions and situated conditions (Leistner and Schmidt-Lux
2012, 330).
Frame conditions are those that have already been described by Durkheim,
such as the collective gathering of people, the spatial constraints of that gather-
ing, and collectively performed practices such as rituals. Less attention has been
given so far to what they call situated conditions. These include for instance at-
tention or concentration on a common focus point. Gatherings of people do not
necessarily lead to joint attention, even though the frame conditions might pro-
vide a dense atmosphere, for instance through the proximity of bodies in a sta-
dium. It is the bundling of attention that boosts the likeliness of a collective ef-
fervescence. Accordingly, it could be argued that collective ecstasy is more likely
in groups in which people already know each other and each other’s attitudes,
such as in religious rituals. As another situated condition, Leistner and Schmidt-
Lux describe the internal precondition of being compassionate, which seems to
be an emotional pulsation, or an alternation between observing and getting
drawn into the event. For my own argument in favour of an aesthetics of immer-
sion, this aspect is very compelling, as it demonstrates that collective efferves-
cence oscillates between moments of control and letting go, as I will propose
later in this chapter.
Another valuable approach to effervescence has been proposed by Arthur
Buehler, who, in his article “The Twenty-first-century Study of Collective Effer-
vescence”, not only gives a valuable overview of recent approaches to Durk-
heim’s concept, but also states that collective sentiments are measurable and
that scholars have failed to do so; they “do not have the tools because they ig-
nore transpersonal psychological and transpersonal anthropological methodol-
ogies when studying ritual phenomena” (Buehler 2012, 76). Buehler criticises
Durkheim, and also later anthropologists, for being armchair-ethnologists who
“apparently ha[ve] the superior perceptual ability to know what is really happen-
ing [during collective effervescence, S.S.] on the basis of (necessarily) flawed eth-
nographic data” (Buehler 2012, 78). And he continues: “Indeed, there is no evi-
dence in Elementary Forms that collective effervescence brought about changes
in the individual or in society” (Buehler 2012, 78). To give flesh to the bones of
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Durkheim’s theory, Buehler claims that collective effervescence is an altered
state of consciousness and therefore can better be explained with insights
from intense ethnographic fieldwork, including radical participation. He goes
even further by contesting what he calls the scientific-materialist epistemology,
what most anthropologists represent. “This so-called objectivity in doing re-
search is intrinsic to the scientific-materialist paradigm—to the point that
there is a ‘taboo of subjectivity’” (Buehler 2012, 81). In order to better understand
the effects of collective effervescence in terms of altered states of consciousness,
Buehler claims: “To do fieldwork in a twenty-first-century context studying col-
lective altered states of consciousness means using a methodology that produces
kinds of subjective knowledge involving a change in the investigator’s own state
of consciousness” (Buehler 2012, 83).
Without opening up the old discussion of the insider-outsider problem here,
I think on the one hand that Buehler raises an important point for the topic in
question, but on the other hand I also think that we do not need to follow its
radicalness. I totally agree that scholars in anthropology and in the study of re-
ligion should not be afraid of their research subjects. On the contrary, for re-
searching contemporary religions one has to go where religion happens in real
life in order to perceive for oneself how a religion is practiced in its everyday con-
text. This is the only way to get drawn into the reality of the religious group, its
rituals and sensations, and this is what participatory observation is all about.
Yet, for Buehler (2012, 89) this is not enough: “The ‘participant-observer’ is a cog-
nitive approach that necessarily treats the native as ‘other’ as it removes the an-
thropologist from the actual experience itself”. I believe that it should be the
personal decision of the scholar whether or not he/she joins religious rituals
and is open for personal experiences. The crucial question is not so much that
of intense participation, since this should happen anyway in the field, but the
question is whether the scholar is able to take a distanced stance again after
leaving the field, in order not to become an advocate of the religious tradition
he or she is studying.
However, it is true that most writings on collective effervescence in recent
decades were mainly theoretical, elaborating on Durkheim’s idea and sociology.
It is therefore necessary, first, to take more empirical examples into account in
order to better understand how collective effervescence in a particular situation
emerges and to describe the effects it has on the individual, and, second, to look
for alternative concepts surrounding the perception and sensations involved in
collective effervescence (such as altered states of consciousness) in order to en-
rich the sometimes ambiguous term effervescence.
These briefly discussed approaches to Durkheim’s concept of collective effer-
vescence have all highlighted the necessity of looking more closely at the micro-
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levels of such phenomena, and have at the same time demonstrated that the cru-
cial question for a better understanding of the dispositions and effects of collec-
tive effervescence is that of perception and sensation. In order to develop this
idea further, I will now discuss what I call the material foundations of collective
effervescence, namely the synchronising effects on the body and the mind as
they occur in social interactions in general and in collective effervescence in par-
ticular. From there I will proceed to the idea of “aesthetics of immersion” as a
connective concept in the study of religion.
3 Bodily Synchronisation and the Material Foundation of
Collective Effervescence
So far, we have taken into account new approaches to collective effervescence
mainly coming from sociology. As refreshing as they are by asking new questions
concerning the collective sentiments and sensations underlying the emergence
of collective arousals, they seem to stop their investigations where the physical
body and the senses begin. However, the body and the senses have attracted new
interest recently in sociology as well as in the study of religions. Whereas the
body was long taken as a mere social artefact, newer approaches have started
to highlight aspects of embodiment: meaning social, as well as physical or bio-
logical foundations of the lived body. Manuel Vásquez (2011, 149– 171), for in-
stance, has underlined the importance of taking processes of embodiment
more seriously in the study of religions, and at the same time he holds social
constructionism in check by emphasizing the material aspects of the body rather
than understanding the body only as a social artefact. In his materialist ap-
proach to religion, he does not plead for a positivist or naturalist epistemology
but rather for an integrative perspective that considers sociological, neuroscien-
tific and phenomenological approaches to understanding religion in practice.
Here, I follow this materialist perspective in order to investigate the embodied
dispositions at work in collective effervescence.
In recent decades, new insights from the cognitive sciences have given a
deeper understanding of how embodied and social cognition works, and just
lately cognitive psychologists and anthropologists have (again) become interest-
ed in the bodily and social dynamics of social interactions in general and of
synchronised behaviour and collective effervescence in particular. In conse-
quence, I will demonstrate that some of these insights into bodily and cognitive
synchronisations are a more comprehensive—yet not exclusive—approach to col-
lective effervescence (Schüler 2012). It is this multifaceted examination of effer-
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vescence, which instructs our understanding of the aesthetics of immersion as a
connective concept in the study of religion.
The bodily effects of interactive behaviours and the unfolding bodily dynam-
ics were first explored by Norman Triplett (1861– 1934), one of the first scholars
in social psychology, who found in 1898 that the sheer presence of other persons
could enhance the physical powers of individuals (Triplett 1898; see also Davis,
Huss, and Becker 2009). Triplett was able to show that cyclists became more ef-
fective and faster when they were cycling in a group-race rather than cycling
alone against time. Psychological explanations usually argue that this effect re-
sults from competition. The cyclist wants to be faster than his or her competitors
and, therefore, is able to release more physical power. In other words, the freed
energy derives from his or her will to be faster. This explanation certainly con-
tains some truth; yet, Norman Triplett added another important factor to explain
his observations. In his theory, he holds “that the bodily presence of another
rider is a stimulus to the racer in arousing the competitive instinct; that another
can thus be the means of releasing or freeing nervous energy for him that he can-
not of himself release; and, further, that the sight of movement in that other by
perhaps suggesting a higher rate of speed, is also an inspiration to greater effort”
(Triplett 1898, 516). Triplett points out two important factors here: 1) the bodily
presence of others, and 2) the perception of movement of others. Both factors
not only enhance the conscious will of the racer, but also seem to influence
his behaviour on a subconscious level. The body seems to be responsive to the
presence of others in such a way that this presence changes the whole autonom-
ic nervous system. Émile Durkheim also took notice of Triplett’s experiment and
referred to it to support his idea of collective effervescence.
Like Triplett with his cyclists, we can argue that the term effervescence in ad-
dition to being a social phenomenon also implies cognitive, physiological and
emotional dimensions of mutual perceptions. The presence of, and interaction
with, another person seem to bring changes in the perception and the behaviour
of an individual, resulting in a shared state of mind and a sensory connection
between the two. Even Durkheim took notice of these mutual relations and
the joint dynamic that occurs in groups: “When they are once come together,
a sort of electricity is formed by their collecting which quickly transports them
to an extraordinary degree of exaltation. Every sentiment expressed finds a
place without resistance in all the minds, which are very open to outside impres-
sions; each re-echoes the others, and is re-echoed by the others” (1976, 216–217).
People connect to each other almost unconsciously as they get drawn into per-
ception-action loops that can also be described as mutual synchronisations. In
order to outline the idea of synchronisation, I will now turn to some newer in-
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sights from the social neurosciences, which throw light on the bodily and neural
causes and effects in social dynamics.
Some recent experiments on bodily and cognitive synchronisation have fo-
cused on rhythmic behaviours, such as playing music or dancing, and their cog-
nitive and social effects on the individual. One study “has discovered synchro-
nous brain oscillations in duetting musicians, indicating a direct neural basis
for interpersonally coordinated actions” (Sänger, Müller, and Lindenberger
2012). Another study demonstrates that tumultuous applause can transform it-
self into waves of synchronised clapping (Neda et al. 2000). This synchronised
clapping is not the result of an external stimulus, such as someone clapping
in front of the audience and thereby functioning as a metronome. Instead, the
synchronisation appears and disappears in short waves and somehow seems
to be autonomous or self-organising. In fact, the synchronised clapping results
from collectively reducing the clapping speed, which leads to better physiologi-
cal coordination and action-perception loops that form particular patterns of in-
teraction. Both studies demonstrate that the emerging synchronicity of joint in-
teractions takes place on a neural and on a bodily level.
Other experiments have shown that rhythmic and especially synchronic be-
haviours enhance social cooperation. In one experiment, Reddish, Fischer and
Bulbulia (2013, 1) “compared a condition in which group synchrony was pro-
duced through shared intentionality to conditions in which synchrony or asyn-
chrony were created as a by-product of hearing the same or different rhythmic
beats. We found that synchrony combined with shared intentionality produced
the greatest level of cooperation”. In their experiment, psychologists Scott S.Wil-
termuth and Chip Heath (2009, 1) even demonstrated “that positive emotions
need not be generated for synchrony to foster cooperation”. This shows the
strong effect synchronising movements have on the perception and affective be-
haviours of individuals. Accordingly, these findings support Durkheim’s observa-
tions that collective rituals increase group cohesion and communality.
In a broad sense, synchronisation can therefore best be understood as the
way our brains and bodies effectively form embodied interactions. In modern cog-
nitive sciences the term embodiment marks a new understanding of cognition.
While cognition was understood as a solely mental operation for quite some
time, recent approaches in embodied and social cognition emphasise that the
emergence of cognition is always preceded by physical interaction. Highlighting
this paradigmatic shift, cognitive psychologist Raymond Gibbs (2006, 13) has
pointed out: “Our bodies, and our felt experiences of our bodies in action, finally
take center stage in the empirical study of perception, cognition, and language
and in cognitive science’s theoretical accounts of human behavior”.
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For understanding cognition as embodied cognition we have to consider the
body as the place where perception and action coincide. Italian neurobiologist
Vittorio Gallese (2007) states that we should be wary of proposing strict dichot-
omies between action and perception. The elements that connect action and per-
ception Gallese calls mirror neurons, and explains them thus:When one watches
someone cry, laugh, or get punched, one can almost feel the same sadness, joy,
or pain that person experiences. The reason is that by watching bodily or emo-
tional expressions mirror-neurons are activated that trigger similar somatic and
cognitive states in the brain and body of the observer. Most of the human ability
for empathy is based on the function of mirror-neurons.
Raymond Gibbs (2006, 35) also emphasises a strong “connection between
the mental representation of posture, the movement of one’s own body, and
the perception of posture and movement of other bodies”.While watching others
performing actions with their bodies, the same body images and body move-
ments tend to arise in the observer, triggering similar mental representations
and meanings. As the action of one person can become a stimulus for the actions
of another person, this can also explain why collective rituals can enhance the
emergence of action-perception loops that drive the synchronisation of bodies,
emotions, and (religious) representations. In other words, the perception-action
loops create a collective dynamic which on the one hand becomes an autono-
mous force that drives the bodily movements of the ritual participants, and on
the other hand, influences the sensual perception of the participants to the ex-
tent that they cannot fully distinguish between their own actions and the actions
of others. Anthropologist Maurice Bloch (Bloch 2002, 142) has described this phe-
nomenon as follows: “One enters a ritual mode of communication by radical
modifications of ordinary behavior […] One often synchronises one’s bodily
and linguistic movements with those of others. This is so to the extent that
one is not sure whether it is oneself or another inside oneself who is acting
and using one’s voice and one’s body”.
I therefore argue that it is the emerging dynamics of synchronising bodies
that control the body (Schüler 2012). This can also help us to better understand
phenomena such as glossolalia or spirit possession: the individual embodies the
collective arousal in such a way that the emerging dynamics coordinate his or
her body movements. Accordingly, it is the inter-subjective coordination and syn-
chronisation of bodies in movement that constitute the basis for emerging feel-
ings and representations of the sacred. Just as in the wordless coordination of
the movements of a dancing couple, synchronicity in ritual interaction shapes
the embodied experience of the ritual participants.
Finally, I would contend that the performance of collective effervescence it-
self produces and represents its own aesthetic of synchronisation. It produces an
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aesthetic of synchronisation by means of changing the sensual perception of the
people who become part of a collective event (I have referred to this as a body-
schema of collective effervescence; Schüler 2012). This way, we can also argue
with Catherine Bell (2006, 538) that the ritual is a function of the body and
not the other way around. Furthermore, it represents an aesthetic, in that bodily
synchronisation shapes certain social and cultural formations, structures and
images such as dancing couples or parades, which most people perceive as
something ‘nice to look at’.
In sum, the phenomenon of synchronisation can be found from micro-levels
of neural activity to macro-levels of social and cultural formations. Synchronic
behaviour seems to happen naturally wherever individuals gather in groups
and start to interact through their bodies. In fact, human beings are the only liv-
ing species that is able to move synchronously to rhythmic music. Sociologist
Robert Bellah (2006, 161) has pointed out for instance that “This ability to
‘keep together in time’ is probably one of several biological developments that
have evolved synchronously with the development of culture, but one of great
importance for the ritual roots of society”.
Taking the idea of an aesthetic of synchronisation into account, we can con-
clude that synchronisation works in two ways: 1) in nature and culture we can
find aesthetic formations that emerge from synchronisation (school of fish,
flocks of birds, collective rituals, parades); and 2) there are particular cultural
achievements that enhance the effects of synchronisation and thus produce aes-
thetic forms such as music, dance, sports, public holidays, and of course reli-
gious rituals. In addition, these aesthetics of synchronisation mediate particular
meanings and representations, and support social features such as power, cohe-
sion or belonging. However, I have argued that for an understanding of these so-
cial functions and representations of collective effervescence, it is important to
take into account the bodies in interaction and the emerging dynamics that
drive this interaction. These aspects of embodied cognition and synchronised be-
haviour provide a sound epistemology for investigating the nature of immersion
and to develop a framework for its analysis.
4 Immersion as Affect and Control: The Sensory Navigation
of the Sacred (in Glossolalia)
We have now examined different sociological and anthropological attempts to go
beyond Durkheim’s concept of collective effervescence, and some insights devel-
oped in the cognitive sciences toward understanding the synchronising effects of
embodied and social cognition. I understand both perspectives as a way of fram-
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ing an aesthetics-of-immersion approach to collective effervescence. The crucial
question is how immersion in collective arousals can best be described and ex-
plained in terms of the interplay of different social, physical, sensory, emotional
and cognitive conditions. In this section I will argue that an aesthetic approach
to immersion must connect all these perspectives to find a way of describing the
ambivalent dynamics at work in moments of immersion. In this final section I
will therefore, first, highlight the aspects of affect and control as the central
poles of the ambivalent character of immersion, and, second, unfold these two
aspects into four modes of ritual immersion in order to incorporate the inter-
twined conditions at work. In addition, I will tie these considerations to the em-
pirical example of collective charismatic worship, and especially to the phenom-
enon of glossolalia or speaking in tongues as it can be found in the tradition of
charismatic Christianity and Pentecostalism.
In media studies and art history immersion is often described as a conver-
gence between external and internal representations, a reduction of the differ-
ence between the object observed and the perceiving subject, just as one gets
drawn into a painting or loses oneself in the painting (Grabbe 2012). Even though
this is a convincing description of immersion in the context of viewing art, or
drawn into virtual reality, it fails to describe the manifold factors at work in im-
mersion in the context of religious rituals, and especially in the context of col-
lective effervescence. The divergent feelings of ‘being-drawn-into-something’
and ‘letting-yourself-go’ as they can be observed, for instance, in fan culture, al-
ready indicate that immersion as understood here always involves two sides,
namely affective as well as controlling aspects, and their merging and conver-
gence.
In more general terms affect usually refers to an occurring emotion or temper
with a special quality of feeling or sensing to it, which can cause particular be-
haviours. To smile can therefore be an affect of having sympathy for someone.
Yet, the smile can be automatic and unconscious, just like rubescence can be
the affect of shame. In a ritual condition affective behaviours thus start from a
certain affirmative attitude or temper someone holds towards the ritual. The feel-
ing of ‘being-drawn-into-something’ can be understood as the (socially learned
and expected, and therefore embodied) affect of this “emotional entrainment”
(Collins 2004, xii). However, the ritual participant is not a machine that automat-
ically falls into arousal and entrancement after entering the ritual mode. Rather
he or she tunes in to the ritual atmosphere and thereby gives way for the feeling
of ‘being-drawn-into-something’ while at the same time being able to control the
moment of ‘letting-yourself-go’. In order to elaborate this observation, I will
briefly turn to the empirical example of glossolalia.
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The phenomenon of glossolalia or speaking in tongues has always been a
fascinating object of research to anthropologists, psychologists, theologians
and scholars in the field of religious studies (Goodman 1972; Richardson 1973;
Mills 1986; DeShane 2003; Cartledge 2006).² For some reason, glossolalia has at-
tracted less attention among sociologists (Poloma 2006, 148– 149), even though
it involves collective effervescence. Scholars who have focused on the ritual as-
pect of glossolalia have highlighted the emergence of communitas through the
moments of liminality in charismatic worship (Albrecht 1999). As far as I
know, glossolalia has yet not been investigated as an outcome of collective effer-
vescence and as a form of immersion.
However, with the increasing popularity of Pentecostal and charismatic
Christianity around the globe, glossolalia has taken on different forms and be-
came an identity marker of many churches and parishes. With reference to the
Pentecost story in the New Testament (Acts 2:4– 11), when the Holy Spirit
came upon the Disciples of Christ, many charismatic Christians today believe
that they receive the powers of the Holy Ghost, which causes pneumatic manifes-
tations such as speaking in foreign or unknown languages (tongues), ecstatic
bodily shaking, and even falling on the ground and trembling in the Spirit. Ac-
cordingly, glossolalia is sometimes described as a form of ecstasy or as a form of
possession. It usually occurs in vivid and charismatic forms of worship, accom-
panied by lively or contemplative music, and under the influence of passionate
preaching, praying and singing. Different techniques have been developed to
support the emergence of glossolalia, such as the laying on of hands by people
praying for the one who wants to receive the Spirit (sometimes professional pray-
er teams), or creating wind with a cloth to simulate the coming of the Holy Spirit.
In academic research, glossolalia is often described as a form of trance or
possession, and depicted as solely unconscious and affective behaviour. Certain-
ly, extreme cases of glossolalia, in which someone receives the Holy Ghost and
starts shaking and rolling their eyes, easily catch the attention of researchers.
Yet, not all forms of glossolalia must lead to such extreme behaviours. In fact,
many long-time practitioners of glossolalia can consciously use it as a prayer
technique or switch between normal prayer words and glossolalia. They may
pray silently, burst out with glossolalia suddenly, and moments later fall back
into their silent prayers again. Others may become deeply immersed in a state
of glossolalia while remaining fully conscious. And even those who show such
 It should be mentioned that much research on glossolalia is done by scholars who are also
practitioners (DeShane 2003; Cartledge 2006). This provides support for the recommendation
made by Buehler (2012), mentioned above, that anthropologists studying altered states of con-
sciousness should have personal experience of the phenomenon they are studying.
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extreme pneumatic reactions as rolling on the ground can have moments of con-
scious control. Glossolalia can thus take on different forms that are subject to the
ambivalent character of immersion‒oscillating between affect and control.
Taking this into account, I will now briefly sketch out four idiosyncratic
modes of ritual immersion, which furthermore can be developed into correlating
ideal types of the affective and controlling aspects of immersion. Describing
them as ideal types already indicates that these aspects are usually merged
and intertwined in ritual activities. Consequentially, this should be understood
as an attempt both to differentiate between different factors at work in the per-
ception of immersion and to illustrate their merging aspects. First of all, and in
order to unfold these aspects, it is important to differentiate four basic modes or
levels of ritual immersion, namely the ritual form, the ritual body, the ritual emo-
tion, and the ritual mind.Within each mode of ritual immersion we now can de-
velop the ideal types of affect and control: 1.) Exaltation and contemplation for
the ritual form, 2.) Imagination and concentration for the ritual mind, 3.) Expan-
sion and suspension for the ritual body, and 3.) Floating and navigating for the
ritual emotions (see also Table 1).
Table 1
Modes of Ritual Immersion Ideal Types of Immersion
Affect Control
Ritual Form Exaltation Contemplation
Ritual Mind Imagination Concentration
Ritual Body Expansion Suspension
Ritual Emotion Floating Navigating
4.1 Ritual Form: Exaltation and Contemplation
Contemplation and exaltation describe two typical and widespread forms of im-
mersion in religious rituals. Contemplation is being focused with your mind and
body on sensory perception, such as listening to music or bowing down in front
of an altar (or being focused on your own mind, as in meditation). Contempla-
tion techniques can also cause a deprivation of all senses. In a contemplative
state of mind one sinks into oneself, rests in oneself, and often feelings of
being united with the world or of losing physical boundaries between oneself
and the world are reported. In this way, contemplation (of something) and dep-
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rivation of the senses can stimulate a feeling of immersion. Exaltation, on the
contrary, is to be ecstatic and enthusiastic about something, it is a rapture of
sensual impressions such as music, light, or a charismatic crowd. Exaltation is
often described as getting lifted up with a sense of delight. This is often the
case in charismatic worship or arousing rituals. Contemplation and exaltation
much depend on ritual conditions and both can cause a feeling of inebriation
and therefore seem to have similar effects on the emergence of immersion. How-
ever, these ritual forms must not exclude one another but can include both as-
pects of immersion at once. In the case of charismatic worships phases of con-
templation and exaltation often alternate, and glossolalia can occur in both
states, even though with different emotional and bodily expressions.
4.2 Ritual Mind: Imagination and Concentration
For conceptual purposes, and in order to distinguish the immersive character of
the ritual mind, we need to differentiate between online and offline cognition.
The distinction between offline and online cognition is commonly used in cog-
nitive sciences to describe mental processes that happen in exchange with a so-
cial environment in the here and now (online), or as more internal mental proc-
esses which imagine a what-if scenario (offline), and which can be more or less
conscious in decision making (Niedenthal et al. 2005; Schilbach 2014).
Concentration is thus paying attention to a particular situation. It is being
cognitively online, absorbing information such as the content and meaning of
a sermon or a song. Strong concentration on cognitive information is an impor-
tant step for synchronising with the ritual group. As mentioned earlier (Leistner
and Schmidt-Lux 2012), in order to experience collective effervescence, the group
must share a common perspective, and needs to focus its attention and act as a
unit. Closely related to this kind of intellectual concentration is the act of imag-
ination (offline cognition). Imagination is a more creative way of thinking as
compared to mere concentration (Traut and Wilke 2015). With imaginations we
go beyond perception of the provided content and let ourselves go with our
own ideas, memories, fantasies, and associations. Both concentration and imag-
ination can happen simultaneously or can merge in effervescent arousal (as well
as in a state of deep meditation).Whereas in meditations often one goal is to let
imaginaries pass the mind and not to hold on to them (in order to keep concen-
trated), in collective rituals one dives into the imaginary and anticipations, and
dwells on the collective arousals and representations. In the case of glossolalia
we can also find both aspects of the immersive mind. On the one hand ritual par-
ticipants often pay attention and concentrate on the religious message and pray-
382 Sebastian Schüler
ers of the pastor and this way become a collective unit with shared intentions
and imaginaries. On the other hand, during times of worship and prayers, par-
ticipants can let themselves go and this way become drawn into their imagina-
tions (of the Holy Spirit). During glossolalia aspects of concentration (control)
and imagination (affect) can both be present at the same time.
4.3 Ritual Body: Expansion and Suspension
Suspension and expansion both refer to physical rather than cognitive aspects of
immersion, even though the embodied cognition approach presented above in-
dicates that body and mind cannot be fully separated. Whereas expansion on
a bodily level usually refers to collective rituals, suspension seems to be the
ideal type of immersion in ritual meditation. Yet, we can also find a bodily per-
ception of expansion in the ritual form of meditation, when the meditating per-
son perceives his or her body expanding into space or even dissolving. In addi-
tion, we can find moments of suspension or bodily abeyance in collective rituals.
Leistner and Schmidt-Lux (2012) also distinguish between suspension and ex-
pansion in their article on effervescence in fan cultures. They describe the alter-
nating phases of a soccer game in which the fans more or less passively watch
the game and then—in the next moment—passionately join in the arousing emo-
tions when something exciting happens on the playing field. Suspension is thus
being passively present in a crowd, a way to temporise one’s movements, a sort
of “wait and see what happens next” attitude, but always in anticipation of the
next (bodily) agitation and passionate arousal. Expansion is active bodily partic-
ipation, the passionate communion and the emotional arousal expressed
through body movements. Like the observations made during a soccer game,
in collective religious rituals such as charismatic worship, moments of physical
passiveness alternate with moments of physical excitation. These bodily condi-
tions often correlate with floating and navigating emotions, as will be described
below.
4.4 Ritual Emotion: Floating and Navigating
The metaphors of floating and navigation represent an attempt to describe an-
other relation between online and offline cognition. Floating can therefore be
understood as mental absorption or immersion in a state of mind and bodily per-
ception in which one drifts away from the actual happenings (offline cognition).
A floating mind often goes along with bodily delight, a weightless feeling. Day-
Aesthetics of Immersion 383
dreaming is a good example, which demonstrates that it is more than just think-
ing about something else (like what to buy for dinner) while sitting in the class-
room. The emotion of floating can occur during both contemplation and exalta-
tion (also often described as trance) and therefore represents a crucial moment
of immersion in effervescence. In meditations a floating feeling can correlate
with the perception of a dissolving body. In collective rituals floating can emerge
as an affect of collective emotional arousal and intersubjectivity.
However, moments of immersion do not solely work in terms of trance or a
floating feeling, but can also converge with moments of online cognition, where
navigation of one’s behaviour is possible. The metaphor of navigation can be un-
derstood as a way of observing one’s own perceptions and behaviours while
being more or less able to control and direct them. In the case of trance in reli-
gious rituals, for instance, there are always moments when the person in trance
seems to be awake and conscious of his or her behaviours and decisions, while
at the same time behaving almost out of control. Moments of offline and online
cognition thus merge during immersive feelings and constitute two intriguing as-
pects of immersion. As already mentioned above, for glossolalia we can often ob-
serve these two ambivalent aspects, for instance, when a practitioner is deeply
immersed in speaking tongues but at the same time seems to be conscious
and aware of what he or she is doing.
These brief descriptions of four modes of ritual immersion are an attempt to
differentiate the sensory forms and conditions at work in the phenomenon of im-
mersion. They demonstrate the twofold dynamics of affect and control that con-
stitute the aesthetical perception of immersion. On the one hand, affective be-
haviour plays a central role in everyday practice as it coordinates our
movements and thinking in an economical way. Routines can maintain affective
behaviours in such a way that these behaviours more or less become subcon-
scious. On the other hand, controlling our movements and thinking gives us con-
fidence in what we do and it makes us rational in our decisions. Collective rituals
have often been described as a loss of control and rationality. The aesthetics of
immersion approach is an attempt to demonstrate that for the emergence of col-
lective effervescence both affect and control play a vital role and can converge in
such a way that affective and controlling behaviours seem to merge or at least
unfold their own dynamics of immersion. Finally, by making use of Durkheim’s
concept of collective effervescence as a socially constructed (and bodily and sen-
sory induced) demarcation between the profane and the sacred, we can argue
that the aesthetics of immersion approach offers a contribution to describing
how the collective sacred is navigated through the individual’s sensory percep-
tions of affect and control in moments of immersion.
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5 Conclusion
In this chapter I have introduced and developed the concept of aesthetics of im-
mersion in order to gain new insights into how collective effervescence works on
the micro-level of individual perception rather than on the macro-level of a so-
ciety. As has been shown, research in the social sciences has already suggested
to take a closer look at the individual and interactive mechanisms involved in the
emergence of collective arousals. By introducing the concept of embodied syn-
chronisation, I have attempted to explain such interactive mechanisms using
new insights from the cognitive sciences and neurosciences. In terms of episte-
mology, I have advocated to make a connection between social approaches and
cognitive and embodied approaches to explain and describe forms of collective
synchronisation and to support a material and aesthetic perspective on efferves-
cence in order to enrich the one-sided sociological perspective that has dominat-
ed scientific discourses for so long.
With its focus on perception, the aesthetics of religion approach prepares the
way for developing a basic concept of aesthetics of immersion. This concept,
briefly outlined, already has the potential to describe the mechanisms at work
in the emergence of collective effervescence. Finally, I have shown how the con-
cept of immersion can be applied to the context of glossolalia.While glossolalia
is often treated as a form of possession, I have argued that the immersive char-
acter of glossolalia is a twofold process of affect and control in which the ritual
practitioner navigates the emergence and embodiment of sacred manifestations,
as well as the dynamics of collective effervescence. Certainly this discussion of
the concept of aesthetics of immersion is only a starting point for future re-
search, and not a full-fledged theory. Nevertheless, I hope that I have been
able to synchronise my thoughts with those of my readers.
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